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Abstract
This paper describes an approach for detecting the presence or emergence of
Organised Crime (OC) signals on Social Media. It shows how words and phrases,
used by members of the public in Social Media posts, can be treated as weak
signals of OC, enabling information to be classified according to a taxonomy.
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) is used to group information sources, according
to Crime-type and Location, thus providing a means of corroboration and
creating OC Concepts that can be used to alert police analysts to the possible
presence of OC. The analyst is able to ‘drill down’ into an OC Concept of
interest, discovering additional information that may be pertinent to the crime.
The paper describes the implementation of this approach into a fully-functional
prototype software system, incorporating a Social Media scanning system and a
map-based user interface. The approach and system are illustrated using Human
Trafficking and Modern Slavery as an example. Real data is used to obtain results
that show that weak signals of OC have been detected and corroborated, thus
alerting to the possible presence of OC.
Keywords: organised crime; social media; entity extraction; formal concept
analysis
Introduction
The vociferous proliferation of the Internet, and more recently Social Media, into
society and the everyday lives of its citizens has, over the last fifteen or so years,
resulted in a sea-change in the behaviours and perceptions we have in relation to the
information that is shared freely online [1]. Such behaviour has resulted in the cre-
ation of a vast repository of information that holds potential value as an intelligence
resource, and the emergence of the open-source researcher as a valuable skill-set
within the analytical repertoire of the police and other security agencies. Resources
such as social media, RSS news feeds, interactive street-maps and online directory
services all provide valuable stores of information that can be used to support ex-
isting investigative and analytical practices in response to serious and organised
crime. This paper’s novelty concerns the application of Formal Concept Analysis
(FCA) in combination with automated information retrieval and natural language
processing tools to identify, extract, categorise and corroborate information from
open web sources which may be used to identify the early onset of organised crime.
Specifically, the paper looks to identify what we will refer to as ‘weak signals’, and
looks to transform these signals into corroborated alerts linked to the presence or
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emergence of organised crime activity, including gang activity, the trade and use of
illegal narcotics, gun crime, Human Trafficking, and Modern Slavery. This research
described in this paper forms part of a larger project; ePOOLICE (early Pursuit
against Organised crime using envirOnmental scanning, the Law and IntelligenCE
systems). The project, which concluded in 2016, aimed to develop a prototype envi-
ronmental scanning system, integrating a number of promising and mature technical
components to semantically filter information from open-sources, such as the web
and social media, to identify information that may constitute weak-signals of or-
ganised crime. The project sought to identify the extent to which the organised
crime threats could be detected at an early stage, prior to their development into
larger more resilient criminal systems, through the automated collection and analy-
sis of data from open sources [2]. These sources primarily contain information from
news outlets, journalists and other outlets, but also take into account posts made
by ’normal’ citizens. The project incorporated the input of domain experts and
practitioners throughout, including law enforcement agencies from the UK, Spain
and Germany, and international organisations such as EUROPOL and the United
Nations Interregional Organised Crime Research Institute (UNICRI). The input of
these organisations in particular, alongside other practitioners from the projects
advisory board, were leveraged in the extraction of requirements, using a combi-
nation of questionnaires, interviews and workshop session throughout the software
development lifecycle, right through to their eventual testing and evaluation.
The concept of weak signals has been abstracted from the Canadian Criminal
Intelligence Service’s (CISC) definitions of primary and secondary indicators [3],
and the perception that in reality there is little tangible value to be extracted from
isolated indicators as there is potential for them to be symptomatic of a variety
of phenomena, many of which are not necessarily in any way indicative of the
presence or threat of organised crime. However, when these indicators are grouped
under certain conditions, such as temporal or geographic proximity to a specific
location and type of activity, they can begin to provide insight into the presence or
emergence of crime. It is with this definition, and the notion of ‘weak signals’ that we
use as the basis of this paper and the approach presented within it. In UK practice,
the College of Policing guidance on the use of Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)
[4] is fairly limited, and no special provisions are made for social media services as
a potential intelligence source. The main uses of open-sources in this respect are to
develop an understanding of the locations relevant to a piece of analysis, to identify
social and demographic changes, to identify external factors that may impact on
crime, disorder and community concerns, to support and develop investigations
by indicating lines of enquiry or the corroboration of other information, and to
support the development of subject and problem profiles through the development
of intelligence products.
Perhaps the greatest shift in the use of the internet over the last 10-15 years
or so is the relative phenomenon that is the usage of Social Media among normal
citizens. In the aftermath of the riots across London and a number of other English
cities which followed the killing of Mark Duggan by the Metropolitan Police in
2011, a Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) commissioned review
highlighted significant inefficiencies in the the way that authorities were equipped
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to deal with social media as an intelligence source [5]. Social Media Intelligence, or
‘SOCMINT’, provides opportunities for providing insights into events and groups,
enhancing situational awareness, and enabling the identification of criminal intent,
providing it is done so in a manner that is appropriately grounded in respect of
human privacy rights [6]. Reports and case studies such as this have demonstrated
the desire and scope for research in the field to explore its novel application in
enhancing the decision making ability of key stakeholders, such as the police, with
more recent events, and social media’s role in the response, such as the Boston,
Massachusetts bombings in 2013 [7], only strengthening the case for its use.
In order to demonstrate the potential utility of SOCMINT, in respect of iden-
tifying the presence and/or emergence of organised crime, the problem domain of
Human Trafficking will be used as the exemplar use-case throughout this paper.
Human Trafficking operates on a vast scale with a truly global impact, with almost
every country in the world acting as an origin, transit or destination location for the
movement and exploitation of human beings. Trafficking is so defined by article 3 of
the Palermo protocol as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulner-
ability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”
[8]. In the UK, Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery has risen to prominence
over recent years into a priority serious and organised crime threat, alongside issues
like cybercrime, drug crime and Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) [9]. Although it is
worth noting that due to recent legislative changes in the UK, it now falls under the
banner of modern slavery which consolidates existing legislation related to slavery
and to human trafficking. However, due to the trans-European scope of this paper,
we will refer mainly back to the principles of the Palermo protocol, using the term
‘Human Trafficking’ interchangeably with ‘Trafficking in Human Beings’.
Organisations such as Europol [10] are increasingly acknowledging growing crim-
inal dependence on the internet and the increasingly trans-European perspective of
serious and organised crime. These changes in the way that information is created
and shared, combined with the diversity in the way that existing forms of criminal-
ity are being conducted provides the opportunity, and desire, for the development of
new means to assist law enforcement in combating it. To provide one such approach
to enable this, the tools described here facilitate the identification, extraction, pro-
cessing, analysis and presentation of data from open sources, such as social media,
that can reveal insight into the emergence and presence of crime both in an oper-
ational sense; by identifying specific phenomena that are linked to discrete types
of crime, and from a strategic perspective in the identification and visualisation of
strategic trends through the corroboration of different crime indicators. While at
one end of the scale international intelligence agencies such as the National Secu-
rity Agency’s (NSA) PRISM programme are facilitating the acquisition, fusion and
analysis of vast amounts of data from disparate sources [11], the (known) resources
and capability of law enforcement agencies (both locally, regionally and even inter-
nationally) are recognised to be much more modest - with the use of data from open
sources and social media often a manual task, and the remit of just a few specialist
analysts and officers within each force [12].
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Figure 1 The Elements of Human Trafficking
Taxonomy of Organised Crime
In beginning to model its constituent elements it is necessary to ascertain a thor-
ough understanding of the actual problem domain - human trafficking, by drawing
upon established definitions used to describe and diagnose the problem by the prac-
titioner base. The UNODC [8] have defined, using the UN Palermo protocol as the
basis, what they refer to as, the three constituent ‘elements’ of trafficking, these
being the ‘act’, ‘means’ and ‘purpose’, see Figure 1. Firstly, the ‘act’ refers to what
is being done, this can include context such as whether and how the victim has
been recruited, transported, transferred or harboured. The question of how this is
being achieved is answered by the ‘means’, which seeks to establish whether force is
being used as the basis of manipulation, such as through kidnapping, abduction or
the exploitation of vulnerabilities, or more subtle methods such as through fraud,
imposing financial dependencies or coercion. The final element, the ‘purpose’ es-
tablishes the reason why the act and means are taking place, or to put it simply -
the form of exploitation behind the act and means, be it for forced labour, sexual
exploitation and prostitution, organ harvesting or domest ic servitude.
This definition and categorisation provides an ideal underpinning for the forma-
tion of a taxonomy of Human Trafficking that can be used to form the basis of
an approach to automatically identify and extract valuable data from open sources
(Figure 2). This taxonomy in actuality forms part of a larger model, consisting of
elements of a broader range of organised crime threats, including the cultivation and
distribution of illegal narcotics. The elements of the taxonomy are defined across
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Figure 2 Organised Crime Taxonomy (excerpt)
four groups, visualised here using vertical columns. The first of these columns, start-
ing from the left, is used as a high level categorisation used to separate between
different crime types. The second deals with different elements within a specific
type of crime - in this case one of the three component parts of trafficking, while
subsequent columns, type and element, are used to show further more specialised
aspects of these elements.
Each of the nodes contained within the taxonomy represents a ruleset designed
to determine the relevance of a piece of content, in this case a particular Twitter
posting’s relevance to the subject matter - Human Trafficking. The level of special-
isation of the rules themselves follows the structure of the taxonomy, moving from
more generic words or phrases that may indicate Human Trafficking used at the
higher levels of the taxonomy, whereas the more specialised end of the taxonomy,
more nuanced rules that may allude to the presence of criminality are used. Running
parallel to the process of content categorisation is the requirement for content (or
named-entity) extraction. The specific content and nature of the rules is informed
by the input of experts and practitioners in the field, elicited through workshops
and additional desk based research around organised crime indicators. A more de-
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tailed discussion of the process of defining rules and the nature of these indicators
is included in [13].
The process of extracting named-entities and facts varies in complexity, from
the use of simple lookup tables containing keyword lists, to more sophisticated
approaches making use of part-of-speech tagging and grammatical and predicate
rules to detect the use of terms within specific contexts. Data such as this is most
commonly available through social media services like Twitter. However, in reality,
research suggests that less than 1% of all Twitter posts actually contain geo-location
information, thus making it necessary to pursue other approaches in order to in-
crease the amount of potentially useful data available. In this regard, a number of
approaches have been used, from simple keyword searches, to more complex algo-
rithmic approaches. In one such example, researchers from IBM have developed an
approach that uses the content of tweets that do contain geotags, and then searches
for similar content that does not contain them in order to assess areas where content
may have originated from, as part of a larger piece of research aimed at identify-
ing the home location of Twitter users. The tests conducted as part of the study
reported accuracy of around 58% [14]. Here however, the focus is somewhat differ-
ent, whereby the approach seeks to extract context in relation to named entities
to enable conclusions to be inferred about events or phenomena in specific, named
locations.
Weak Signals of Organised Crime
To enable the development of a taxonomy that enables us to model and structure the
information deemed useful to extract we can refer to a wealth of literature from both
academic and practitioner perspectives that provide insights into the factors that
contribute to and indicate organised crime. These indicators vary from high level,
secondary information such as Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological,
Legal and Environmental (PESTLE) factors, right down to operationally oriented
information that offers guidance on how to identify potential victims of trafficking.
Existing models to anticipate changes and developments in organised criminality
across geographic areas have focused on this kind of data alongside existing crime
statistics [15].
In the past, and to some extent a problem that still exists, a lack of information
and common understanding about what Human Trafficking is has hindered the im-
pact and effectiveness of efforts to combat it [16]. Despite varied and wide-ranging
counter-trafficking initiatives from NGOs, Law Enforcement and Governments, re-
liable information regarding the magnitude and nature of trafficking across regional
and national borders is still hard to come by due to a number of issues around the
sharing, fusion and understanding of data that is already being collected [17]. The
purpose of the approach developed and described in this paper is not to provide
a statistically accurate representation of the presence and emergence of trafficking
but rather to increase access to, and usability of, data from previously untapped
open-sources. In previous work, we have discussed indicators across a three-level
model [13] moving from credible and accepted indicators of trafficking at level 1
of the model, through to the observations and content created online, including on
social media, by citizens regarding these ‘weak signals’.
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Figure 3 Organised Crime Taxonomy
In this paper we discuss the latter and more specifically the modelling and use
of this information as ‘weak signals’ that allude to the presence and/or emergence
of criminality in citizen generated content, whilst using the formal definitions and
doctrine that exists to underpin the framework and organisation of the model itself.
Perhaps the most comprehensive list of indicators comes from the UNODC [18] who
provide an extensive typology categorised by different types of exploitation such as;
domestic servitude, child sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and begging/petty
crime - the labels used in the taxonomy structure are outlined in Figure 2. Using
sexual exploitation as an example, indicators include things such as the appearance
that persons are under the specific control of another, that the person(s) appear
to own little clothing, or rely on their employer for basic amenities, transport and
accommodation and more. The taxonomy excerpt included in Figure 3 shows at
a high level how a taxonomy node focused on attributes which may indicate an
individual is vulnerable, or a potential victim of trafficking or exploitation, may
contain specific rules designed to identify text which suggests they may have been
subjected to violence, as one example of a weak-signal. Although in this form, these
indicators are quite abstract and it can be difficult to see how they may manifest
in real, open-source, data - it is possible to develop rules looking for keywords and
phrases that can provide ‘weak-signals’ of their existence online.
In order to facilitate the identification and extraction of these weak signals in
social media and other open-sources, what we will refer to as ‘contextual extraction’
methods [19] are used in order to identify, and subsequently extract, key entities
and facts (i.e. previously unknown relationships between different entities) from the
data. This approach to information extraction using natural-language processing
builds upon the existing principles of template based information extraction [20],
also sometimes referred to as ‘Atomic Fact Extraction’ [19]. These ‘facts’ enable the
extraction of entities within a specific context, i.e. locations in relation to an arrest
or type of exploitation on a per sentence basis.
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Entity Example
Location Atlanta
Boston
San Diego
Event Trafficking
Arrest
Transaction
Exploitation CSE
Forced Labour
Forced Prostitution
Table 1 Extracted Entity Examples
Figure 4 Entity and Fact Extraction in Social Media
A number of example entities are included in Table 1.
While in isolation, the extraction of these entities on their own does not necessarily
provide much actionable information, it is possible using rules that attempt to infer
relations between them to begin to make some assumptions about the data and
its content. For example a single tweet may contain multiple locations and other
entities, but without some means to establish a relationship between the two there
is no way to automatically infer, with any confidence at least, that they are linked.
Fortunately, through the use of contextual extraction, and the aforementioned ‘facts’
we can infer these relationships in a number of ways, using prepositions, parts-of-
speech tagging and Boolean operators that specify distance between words and other
parameters. As the examples discussed in this paper refer to data from Twitter only,
these relationships are done on a ‘per sentence’ basis. Figure 4 shows how this works
in practice.
From these rules we can begin to make some assumptions about the entities being
extracted. For example, it is now possible to ascertain with a degree of confidence
that specific locations are in reference to a specific event. At this point, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the challenges posed by the use of SMS-language (textese)
as communication via services such as Twitter do not necessarily adhere to strict
grammar or syntax conventions. Although a number of novel approaches to handle
this type of language are in development (see, for example [21]) due to the use of
examples that use accepted, formal terminology, we do not address this issue here.
By using context-sensitive concept matching using Language Interpretation/Text
Interpretation (LITI) rules [19], concepts can also be matched to the specific con-
text for which they are being used. Using the example of a location, the use of a
specific place in reference to an event or action, such as an arrest can be extracted
by matching locations within proximity of text indicating an event followed by a
preposition and the location. Such an approach brings about a number of potentially
advantageous features. The use of contextual concept definitions enables increased
Andrews et al. Page 9 of 29
levels of accuracy, and thus confidence, in the extracted data relative to the context
in which it is being extracted. For example, instances of location that occur with a
specified number of words, separated by a preposition, of terminology indicating an
arrest, increases the level of confidence that the information is in fact in reference
to the context as opposed to just being any occurrence of a location name in the
text. Social media sites such as Twitter often include features that enable location
information to be captured directly from the browser or mobile application.
Geolocation
To provide location-based corroboration and visualisation, automatic extraction of
named locations from the various data sources is used. Working from an extensive
collection of known locations, the detection and word-level extraction of countries,
regions and cities is performed. However, regions and cities are extracted as-is and
further contextualisation is required to disambiguate the named location from others
that share the same name. For example, the term New York could easily refer to
either New York City or New York State.
Named locations are not extracted as locations alone; the rules within the OC
ontology are used to extract locations against a given OC context where possible.
One example is ‘trafficking location’ which uses rules to detect a context regarding
an entity (individual, group, asset etc.) being trafficked or moved. Another example
is ‘exploitation location’ which detects a named location against OC exploitation
contexts (such as forced labour).
Reverse geocoding, the process of resolving one or more geographical coordinates
from a named location, is applied to acquire the additional contextual informa-
tion required (country, region, city, etc.) to perform effective corroboration and
map-based visualisation. Disambiguation of the location is also a resulting benefit;
however this is based entirely on the popularity, size or importance of a location. For
example, Washington State or Washington, DC are much larger and more widely
referenced than Washington County in Alabama. If Washington, DC has the highest
ranking then the location Washington will identified as Washington, DC.
The reverse geocoding process utilises the Google Maps API. Using this API,
the named location is supplied, returning a list of matching results, by order of
relevance based on the most commonly searched places (i.e. popularity), the size (i.e.
population), or the importance (e.g. capital). Each result provides a geographical
location in decimal latitude/longitude format, along with additional hierarchical
information, for example, New York City is within NY or New York State, and
within the US or United States of America. Since the Scanning System is primarily
investigating a US-based dataset, searches are restricted to the boundary of the US.
It is important to note that a single tweet may contain multiple named locations,
in which case, all of these are resolved and the tweet is processed according to each
of those locations.
Categorisation and Filtering
In addition to extracting facts and entities from the input data, similar techniques
are also utilised as the basis of a rule-based approach to classify content against a
number of pre-defined categories. Membership to one or more of these categories is
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Weak Signal Keywords and Phrases
Physical Injury subjected to violence
timid
forced to have sex
women beaten
Physical Appearance provocative dress
live with a group of women
unhappy
Unable to leave place of residence afraid to leave
under control of others
financially dependant
Irregular movement of individuals men come and go at all hours
women do not appear to leave
lots of activity at night
Table 2 Weak Signals - Keywords and Phrases
Figure 5 Categorization Output
then used as the basis for content filtering. If the content analysed by the crawler
does not meet the criteria of at least one of the rules within the parameters defined
in the content categorisation process, it is then disregarded.
The categorisation model is defined using a similar approach to the entity and fact
extraction model, utilising a number of ‘hand-crafted’ rules organised in a hierarchi-
cal structure, with the only key difference being that rather than being designed to
identify and extract specific pieces of data and/or information they aim to discern
the relevance of the content against the defined topics using the same taxonomy
structure defined in Figure 2. The rules themselves use a range of techniques, again
focusing on the identification of keywords and phrases. A number of examples of
the phrases and keywords used as part of the categorisation taxonomy are shown
in Table 2. Matched content is then assigned a ‘relevancy’ rating depending on the
number of keywords and/or phrases that are met within the match criteria - as
shown in Figure 5.
A Social Media Scanning System
To implement the content extraction and categorisation models, an integrated
pipeline that facilitates the crawling of social media is put in place. This process
manages and enables the seamless collection, restructuring, processing, filtering and
output of the data in preparation for further analysis. The stages of the data prepa-
ration and processing pipeline is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Social Media Scanning Process
Different data sources lend themselves to the identification and extraction of dif-
ferent kinds of information and indicators. For example, the data from the Web and
RSS feeds used in the process allow for the extraction of data related to explicit
instances of past and ongoing criminality, as reported by the media, law enforce-
ment and other outlets. Such data can be used to enhance situational awareness,
identifying key locations and trends in criminality by geographic region. Whereas as
social media, although potentially useful in identifying similar information, can also
be used as a source of identifying ‘weak signals’, due to the presence of commentary
and observations provided by everyday citizens. Though it should be acknowledged
that these posts are particularly uncommon when compared with the data collected
from news outlets, journalists and other interest groups.
To extract and expose data to the processing pipeline and FCA components a
number of approaches are used depending on the source type. Primarily, three
different data types are used by the system; Social Media, Web pages and RSS
feeds although this is flexible and can be adapted to include other disparate data
types, both structured and unstructured. The process for extracting data from each
varies fairly significantly from source to source. In the case of crawling pages from
the web, a number of seed URLs from a hand-curated database are used as a starting
point for the crawling process, with subsequent links within those target URLs also
transversed. These seed URLs consist of local, regional and national news reporting
mediums and LEA (Law Enforcement Agency) web-pages. To filter out noise and
irrelevant data an initial stage of categorisation is used to determine a base level
of relevance to the domain, utilising keywords and phrases that indicate a surface
level relation to criminality, disregarding any source data that does not meet the
criteria defined by the rule-set. Continuing with the example of human trafficking
and modern slavery that is used throughout, the initial filtering criteria contain
rules that both explicitly refer to trafficking and forms of human exploitation and
more subtle, nuanced, rules look for weak signals such as references to injury or signs
of physical abuse, or the presence of paraphernalia that may be linked phenomena
such as drug cultivation. Similarly, a curated set of RSS feeds use a similar method
to web transversal, however these feeds are monitored for changes and updates, as
opposed to being crawled periodically in search of new content.
For social media however, as the main source of focus in this article, the approach
is somewhat different. Utilising the ‘Search API’ offered by Twitter [22], queries
can be made against the service’s index of recent and/or popular posts from the
previous seven days, with only the most relevant tweets returned from during the
time period. At the time of writing, the amount of data returned is limited by
the API’s rate limit, currently set at 180 queries per 15 minutes. This amount
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is subject to change. In terms of the queries themselves, a number of pre-defined
operators exist that allow for the matching of keywords, exact phrases and other
operations. When dealing with larger sources of unstructured data, such as web-
pages or other documents, it is often necessary to heuristically parse the content to
remove additional page elements such advertisements before processing. However,
as the data extracted from Twitter is already sufficiently structured, this step is
not needed here.
Using the same example as in previous figures, the XML enables this content to
be extracted alongside other meta-data, such as the geolocation and other details
about the author, the data and time that the post was made, the date/time it was
extracted by the crawler, keywords used to query the API, and a URL link back
to the original content. Other metadata is also provided by default, but has been
filtered as it is not essential to the process being described. An example of the XML
output is shown in the code snippet below.
<xml version=” 1 .0 ” encoding=” utf−8”>
<art ic le>
<authorgeolocation>Atlanta , GA</authorgeolocation>
<query> t r a f f i c k i n g</query>
<body>People t r a f f i c k e d in to Atlanta f o r sex , labour and
organ removal accord ing to a new repor t</body>
<pdate>20150129</pdate>
<categories>top\HumanTrafficking\Exp lo i t a t i on \ s exua l</
categories>
<TraffickingLocation>Atlanta</ TraffickingLocation>
<ExploitationLocation>Atlanta</ExploitationLocation>
<ExploitationType>Sexual ; Labour ; Organ Harvest ing</
ExploitationType>
</ art ic le>
Applying Formal Concept Analysis
Background to Formal Concept Analysis
A formal description of formal concepts [23] begins with a set of objects X and a
set of attributes Y . A binary relation I ⊆ X × Y is called the formal context. If
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y then xIy says that object x has attribute y. For a set of objects
A ⊆ X, a derivation operator ↑ is defined to obtain the set of attributes common
to the objects in A as follows:
A↑ := { y ∈ Y | ∀x ∈ A : xIy }.
Similarly, for a set of attributes B ⊆ Y , the ↓ operator is defined to obtain the
set of objects common to the attributes in B as follows:
B↓ := { x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ B : xIy }.
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Source 1 × × ×
Source 2 × ×
Source 3 × × ×
Source 4 × ×
Source 5 × × ×
Source 6 × × ×
Source 7 × × × ×
Source 8 × × ×
Source 9 × × × ×
Source 10 × ×
Figure 7 An ‘Organised Crime’ formal context
(A,B) is a formal concept iff A↑ = B and B↓ = A. The relations A×B are then
a closed set of pairs in I. In other words, a formal concept is a set of attributes and
a set of objects such that all of the objects have all of the attributes, there are no
other objects that have all of the attributes and there are no other attributes that
all the objects have. A is called the extent of the formal concept and B is called the
intent of the formal concept.
A formal context is typically represented as a cross table, with crosses indicating
binary relations between objects (rows) and attributes (columns). Figure 7 is a
small example of a formal context where the objects are information sources and
the attributes are named entities, signals of crime categories and values present in
the information sources.
Formal concepts in a cross table can be visualised as closed rectangles of crosses,
where the rows and columns in the rectangle are not necessarily contiguous. FC1,
below, is a example of a formal concept from the Organised Crime formal context
above:
FC1 :
({Crime THB,Location A},
{Source 1, Source 2, Source 5, Source 7, Source 9})
Typically, as the number of attributes in a formal concept increase, the corre-
sponding number of objects that share those attributes reduces - the objects become
more specialised. This behaviour can be seen in FC2, below, with the addition of
the attribute Category Exploitation:
FC2 :
({Crime THB,Location A,Category Exploitation},
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Figure 8 A formal concept tree derived from the Organised Crime formal context
{Source 5, Source 7, Source 9})
FC2 is said to be a sub-concept of FC1. These connections between formal con-
cepts are fundamental in formal concept analysis (FCA) and can be visualised as a
formal concept tree. Figure 8 shows a formal concept tree derived from the Ogan-
ised Crime formal context. Each node is a formal concept. The tree can be read
by understanding that objects are inherited by formal concepts from the right and
attributes are inherited by formal concepts from the left. Thus, for example, formal
concept 1 in the tree is FC1, above, and formal concept 6 in the tree is FC2, above.
The power of FCA to cluster similar objects and to capture increasing specialism
make it an ideal technique for corroborating information sources and providing
‘drill down’ from highly corroborated information at a general level to further,
more detailed, information at a more specialised level. Furthermore, the automated
tools now available for FCA make it applicable in areas where large volumes of data
are being analysed.
Corroborating Information using Formal Concept Analysis
A single tweet containing a weak signal of OC is not a sensible basis for Law En-
forcement Agencies (LEAs) to take action. However, if a number of sources contain
weak signals of the same element of OC from the same location, then this may
form a credible basis to warrant further investigation. Such corroboration can be
automated by the application of FCA [23] to the structured data extracted from
the information sources. FCA can be used to cluster the sources into what we will
call OC Threat Concepts (or simply OC Concepts) where one shared attribute is a
location and another shared attribute is an element of OC. When mining the data
for formal concepts, if a minimum support is set, say of ten information sources,
only OC Threat Concepts with a least ten sources will be obtained.
To carry out FCA, the structured data extracted from the information sources
must be converted into a formal context using a process known as scaling [24, 25].
For example, each location in the data becomes a formal attribute in the context.
If there are 100 locations in the data, there will be a corresponding 100 columns
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OC Taxonomy
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Source containing weak signal of THB ×
Source containing weak signal of Exploitation × ×
Source containing weak signal of Sexual Exploitation × × ×
Source containing weak signal of CSE × × × ×
Figure 9 A Formal Context scaling part of the OC Taxonomy (CSE is Child Sexual Exploitation)
US New York State New York City
Country-Level ×
State-Level × ×
City-Level × × ×
Figure 10 A Formal Context demonstrating hierarchical location scaling
in the formal context, one for each location. The same approach applies to other
named entities, such as drugs. To use ordinal data, such as dates or currency, these
can be scaled using appropriate ranges or ‘bins’ of values.
The weak signals of elements of OC are scaled using the Taxonomy. So, for
example, a weak signal may indicate Human Trafficking, and thus the source in
which the signal was contained will be labeled with the formal attribute Crime-
HumanTrafficking. Several different weak signals may all point to Human Traffick-
ing, and thus sources containing any of them would all be labeled with the attribute
Crime-HumanTrafficking. Other weak signals may point to more specific elements
of Human Trafficking, such as Exploitation which is a component of Human Traf-
ficking (from the taxonomy). A source with such a weak signal will be labeled with
both Crime-HumanTrafficking and Element-Exploitation. Thus the general ‘is a
part of’ rule in a taxonomy becomes naturally captured by FCA (see Figure 9).
This type of scaling greatly adds to the process of corroboration: if there are five
sources of information containing weak signals of THB and five sources containing
weak signals of Sexual Exploitation, for example, this implies there are ten sources
containing weak signals of THB.
A similar approach is used making use of information available from the Google
Maps API. The deep geolocation context, particularly the hierarchical structure,
allows the FCA process to cluster locations at various levels. For a given location,
each element of the resolved location hierarchy is used in the formal context as
shown in Figure 10.
Using this approach, FCA detects and corroborates entities within locations at
various levels in the hierarchy. The detected concepts are then viewable at the
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Figure 11 Tree of OC Concepts
country, state and city levels and can be navigated using the formal concept tree
discussed above.
Experimental Implementation
Using a data set created from 29096 tweets as information sources, obtained by
scanning for tweets containing weak signals of OC, a formal context was created by
scaling the extracted structured data as described above. Using a minimum support
of 80 tweets, the context was mined for OC Threat Concepts using a modification
of the open-source In-Close concept miner [26]. The result is visualised as a formal
concept tree in Figure 11.
In the tree, the head node is the concept containing all the tweets from concepts
that satisfy the minimum support (5512 tweets) and each of the branches is to an
OC Concept - a concept where one attribute is a location and another is an OC.
In this example, every OC is Human Trafficking as this was the type of OC being
searched for by the Scanning System. The number inside each node is simply a
concept ID number assigned by the concept miner. The number outside the node,
below the list of attributes, is the object count (the number of tweets contained
in the concept) and in each case this is above the minimum support threshold of
80. Thus concept 53, for example, has the attributes authorlocation-Atlanta and
Crime-HumanTrafficking, and has 185 objects (tweets). In other words, within the
data set there are 185 tweets that have the author location Atlanta and contain a
weak signal of Human Trafficking. With this high level of corroboration, a police
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Figure 12 Drill-Down for the ‘Atlanta’ OC Concept
analyst will be alerted to investigate this further, and a possible next step in the
investigation is automated by FCA in the form of a ‘drill-down’ to the OC Concept’s
sub-concepts.
OC Concept Drill-Down
The OC Concepts in Figure 11 contain limited information - they only have a loca-
tion and the OC Human Trafficking. However, individual tweets in the OC Concept
may contain further information pertinent to the OC. But physically inspecting
185 tweets, although far less work than examining 29096 tweets, is nonetheless
quite time consuming. However, several tweets in the OC Concept may all share
the same additional information and this can be divulged by examining the sub-
concepts of an OC Concept. Each of the sub-concepts will have the same location
and crime as the original OC Concept but with one or more additional attributes
from the structured data extracted from the tweets. Such a result can easily be
obtained by mining the data for concepts that contain the attributes of the OC
Concept and at the same time reducing the minimum support required.
Figure 12 shows a concept tree with the ‘Atlanta’ OC Concept from Figure 11
and its sub-concepts produced when the minimum support is set to 5.
In the tree, concept 3 shows that 10 of the 185 ‘Atlanta’ tweets also contain
a reference to the drug amphetamine. They may not all contain the actual word
amphetamine, but they will all contain a word or phrase that is commonly used
to mean or refer to amphetamine. But using lists of such words and phrases, the
entity extraction process carried to produce the structured data will thus label each
of these tweets with the attribute drug-amphetamine, which in turn enables the
FCA to group them together.
Concept 2 shows that 6 of the 185 Atlanta tweets also contain the location
Central America and the county Mexico. Furthermore, a semantic rule in the
entity extraction process has determined that Mexico is being referred to in the
tweet as a trafficking location and thus these tweets are labeled with the attribute
traffickinglocation-Mexico.
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Concept 1 shows that 10 of the 185 Atlanta tweets contain weak signals of the
OC Human Trafficking element Exploitation and the exploitation type Sexual. Fur-
thermore, in 8 of those 10 tweets there are weak signals of CSE, further specialising
the OC.
Thus, through this simple automated process, the police analyst has potentially
more information that may be pertinent to an OC and more specific information
regarding the nature of the OC. Because the original OC Concept involved corrob-
oration by a large number of sources, the analyst can gain some confidence that
further information contained in sub-sets of the tweets has credibility. Indeed, the
analyst may now want to trace back to the original tweets (or to the text of these
tweets) and, because they have been grouped together by FCA, it is simple task to
provide this facility.
Implementation for End-users
The processes and components described above were implemented as a part of
the European ePOOLICE Project [2]. The OC Taxonomy and entity extraction
components developed by the authors were implemented in the system to provide
data to be consumed by various analytic components, one of which was the FCA OC
Threat corroboration component described above. The user interface was developed
in close collaboration with Law Enforcement Agency end-users, using a map-based
approach. The system allows a police analyst to select a region and type of OC
to scan for and then acquire sources on the Internet (such as tweets) that match
those search criteria. Structured data is extracted automatically from the sources,
as described above, allowing the user to carry out a variety of analytic tasks and
display the results in an appropriate visualisation. Figure 13 shows the user interface
with the FCA ‘Corroborated Threats’ option selected. There are a number of other
options listed on the left of the screen and these components were developed by
other members of the ePOOLICE consortium [2]. However, it is outside the scope
of this article to describe these other components here.
The map in Figure 13 is displaying the OC Concepts as described in the example
above. Various icons are used by the system to indicate types of OC and the one
here is for Human Trafficking. The analyst is able to click on an OC Concept icon to
display its information (essentially this is the attributes and objects of the concept)
and drill down to its sub-concepts. Figure 14 shows the ‘Atlanta’ OC Concept with
its associated information, including its attributes (crime: humantrafficking and
location: atlanta) and its objects (tweets), listed as URLs allowing the analyst to
trace back to the original sources. The sub-concepts are displayed as icons below the
original concept and Figure 15 shows the additional information displayed when one
of these sub-concepts is clicked on - in this case the attribute drug: amphetamine.
The 10 sources that contain a reference to amphetamine are listed and at this point
the analyst may wish to look at some of these. Clicking on a URL will take the user
to the original source. Above the lists of attributes and sources is a list of categories.
These are categories that are referred to in one or more of the sources in the OC
Concept, but not in all of them. Thus they give the analyst further information of
interest but without an indication of their level of corroboration.
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Figure 13 ePOOLICE system showing OC Concepts
Evaluation
Although difficult to evaluate in an operational sense (we cannot, for example, act
as the police in investigating organised crime) it is possible to say something about
the quality of the results in terms of the accuracy of the weak signals identified.
A sample of 20 inferred OC categories were selected by police experts as having
the greatest potential for providing information useful to their investigations and
these were inspected against the original text sources, with 16 out of 20 correctly
identified from weak signals as being crime related. In the other four cases, the
context within which the identified words or phrases were used clearly indicated
that the source was not referring to OC. Although only a small sample, this was
an encouraging level of false positives. However, further evaluation is required on
larger samples to produce a statistically significant result.
In order to test the accuracy of the developed content categorisation and named-
entity extraction models, an evaluation set of 164 Twitter posts was selected from
the existing larger corpus that is used as the exemplar throughout this paper. The
particular tweets selected were done so randomly, however provision was made to
remove duplicate ‘retweets’ or posts that were simply identical to others already
contained within the evaluation set, so as to ensure a broader range of entities and
rules within the model were tested. The reason for the selection of a relatively small
corpus of test data was to enable the manual categorisation of the named entities
contained within the data, utilising the domain knowledge embedded within the
research team in order to establish, based on the rules and categories known within
the model, the areas of best fit for the content under analysis. The manual assess-
ment allowed for the use of human intuition to denote when proper nouns referring
to places etc. were in fact referring to a place, regardless of capitalisation, a process
much more difficult when using automated tools. Similarly the human assessment
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Figure 14 ePOOLICE system showing San Diego and Atlanta OC Concepts and details of the
Atlanta OC Concept
can account for errors in grammar, spelling and other issues which may have pre-
vented a successful match using the automated tools, in addition to accounting for
words or phrases that may be indicative of a particular form of exploitation or crime
that may not be contained within the taxonomy and ruleset used by the automated
tools. To reduce the risk of error in the manual process, the evaluators were initially
briefed by a police specialist in the use of social media as an intelligence source.
The same data-set was then processed through the model using the developed
NLP model and tools, and the resulting .csv outputs compared to determine the
accuracy of the automated approach. The evaluation was done so on a binary basis,
with a 1 value awarded in instances where the results of the analysis matched
exactly, and a null value awarded if the results did not match. The results of the
evaluation by output field are presented as percentages in Figure 16 indicating the
success ratio of the automated approach. A subsequent analysis was also conducted
to determine the number of false-positives returned using the automated model,
that is the the number of non-null values which do not match the value returned
during the manual processing of the same dataset. The results of this analysis are
included as a separate series in Figure 16.
In a number of areas, the model returned results accurately 100% of the time. For
entities such as ‘pdate’ (date of posting), author and organisation this was due to
the rules determining their extraction simply identifying the presence of raw values
from the data. In the case of pdate and author these are pre-defined fields in the
source content provided through the Twitter API. For Organisation this is done
through existing supervised learning techniques embedded within the SAS Content
Categorisation software which are built through reading in a large dataset of organ-
isation names against which rules are generated using well established techniques
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Figure 15 ePOOLICE system showing Drill-Down information
such as Hidden Markov Models and Decision Trees [27]. In instances where the au-
tomated model was 100% accurate, it is expected that the results indicate 0% false
positives.
The decline in accuracy of location extraction entities continent, country and city
as they become more granular can be attributed to the fact that the model uses
simple lookup-tables of known locations as the basis of the extraction. While the
number of continents and countries and the various names to which they are often
referred is relatively finite, the number of towns and cities in the United States alone
means that this simple method of extraction can be prohibitive for entities where
potential range of values to be returned is vast. This difficulty is also reflected in the
increasing number of false positives recorded for these entities due to the potential
for place names to be the same as common nouns.
For other entities such as exploitationlocation, traffickinglocation and arrestloca-
tion the results are again varied. In this instance, predicate rules which look for
separate entities such as Location alongside syntax which may indicate the pres-
ence of exploitation, arrest or trafficking within the same sentence were used. While
useful to an extent, the rules by their nature are limited. The cognitive abilities
of a human analyst with knowledge of the domain may be able to infer that, for
example, an individual being recovered from a particular location is likely to have
been exploited in that same location, whereas the rules used rigidly rely on the ex-
plicit presence of language indicating exploitation has taken place. A large number
of false-positives for these entities are also returned. This again reflects the value
of human cognition in the sense-making process. While the example provided in
Figure 4 demonstrates how these rules can work well, small changes to the syntax
could have resulted in the return of a false positive. For instance if the text had
said “Atlanta news reports Human Trafficking issues across the country” the ruleset
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Figure 16 Content Categorisation and Named-Entity Extraction Evaluation Results
would still return Atlanta as a trafficking location, where as a human analyst could
infer that a more appropriate location would be the United States, or that it’s not
really possible to determine a location at all based on the information provided.
A further qualitative evaluation was provided by 24 end-users during a hands-on
feedback session held in December 2015. Various law enforcement agencies from
within the EU were represented, including those from regional, national and inter-
national organisations, from countries including the UK, France, Spain, Belgium
and Estonia. For the evaluation, users were first given an introduction to, and
demonstration of the system, by a facilitation team from the ePOOLICE project,
highlighting both an overview of what it aims to do at a conceptual level and a
practical guide to its features, functions and user interface. Participants were then
invited to test the system, and asked to provide qualitative feedback on usability
and utility. This feedback was collated using physical questionnaires at the end of
the test and through an interactive debrief session where they were able to pass
comments and ask further questions about the system to the facilitation team. The
feedback gleaned highlighted factors such as the need to refer potentially personal
and sensitive information about the origins of the identified indicators so they could
be followed up, and, the complexity of the way in which the systems outputs were
presented via the map-based interface. However, feedback regarding the utility of
the system in providing a means to show trends in current, and alluding to emerg-
ing, forms of criminality in different geographic areas was overwhelmingly positive,
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especially through the utilisation of previously untapped data sources such as social
media.
Related Work
Until relatively recently, commercial web-crawling systems have tended to focus on
providing market research for clients’ products and services. A prominent example
of this is the sentiment analysis work carried out by SAS using keyword search
combined with taxonomy-based text-mining [28]. However, companies are adapting
these systems to provide intelligence to law enforcement agencies [29]. BlueJay
software, made by BrightPlanet, was able to monitor social media during high
profile events and illicit activities, to aid LEAs in the collection of incriminating
evidence, although the service has now been discontinued due to the increasing cost
of accessing Twitter data [30]. OpenMIND advertises the ability to crawl the “deep
web” – inaccessible to search engines but accessible to their software - to provide
agencies with “actionable intelligence” [31]. The majority of these tools are designed
to be used by the companies that made them, to provide data and intelligence to
LEAs as a service. By contrast, the ePOOLICE system has been designed with the
police as end-user in mind, providing constant, ‘in house’, monitoring and a user
interface designed for the police analyst. However, LexisNexis, have also developed
a “next-generation” policing platform designed for use by LEAs, for crime analysis
and investigation. The platform is called Accurint Virtual Crime Center, and links
different data types on people, places, vehicles, phones and other information into
one visual dashboard. As such, Accurint Virtual Crime Center perhaps comes closest
to what the ePOOLICE system is attempting. However, the LexisNexis approach
is based on accessing and fusing data from existing databases (such as national
law enforcement databases and public records databases) rather than obtaining
intelligence from scanning the Internet and social media. Thus, Accurint Virtual
Crime Center provides investigators with a central access point and analytics for
large volumes of dispersed and disparate data, but without the immediate and
real-time monitoring provided by ePOOLICE.
In terms of current research, probably the most prominent example that bears sim-
ilarities with ePOOLICE is the work being carried out at Cardiff University, UK,
developing a system to scan social media to predict outbreaks of hate crime [32].
Researchers are building a machine-learning based classifier to distinguish tweets
displaying hateful or antagonistic views with a focus on race, ethnicity, or religion
[33]. By identifying textual features of such tweets, the idea is for the classier to
be used to predict off-line hate crime based on the level of on-line ‘cyber-hate’.
It is interesting to note that the researchers used natural language processing to
derive syntactic grammatical relationships in a tweet that can be used as features
for classification to enrich their lexicon of cyber-hate beyond simple unigram and
bigram terms. This type of text analysis is central to the ePOOLICE entity and re-
lation extraction system (as described above). However, whereas the Cardiff system
is intended as a predictive tool, ePOOLICE is focused on information extraction
and visualisation. It was this focus, and the proven track-record of tools such as
SAS’s text mining software, that provided the motivation in ePOOLICE to exclude
machine learning in its processes. Nevertheless, if a predictive element was to be
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added to the ePOOLICE system, clearly a machine learning approach would be ap-
propriate. Indeed, in a similar, parallel, European project (project ATHENA [34],
in which the authors’ organisation was a partner), machine learning was added as
a means of assessing the credibility of information in social media [35].
Increasingly, organised forms of crime, particularly those which involve human
exploitation; modern slavery, human trafficking and CSE take place in some capac-
ity online. With the proliferation of these ‘cyber-enabled’ crimes [36], the vectors
through which individuals are recruited, deceived and coerced into exploitation
has expanded exponentially [37]. The use of social media, classified ads and other
internet mediums is now widespread in human trafficking cases, including those
associated both labour and sexual exploitation, and domestic servitude [38, 37].
The internet provides a venue for both the recruitment, deception and coercion of
potential victims, and for the sale of illicit goods and services that use trafficked
labour and sex-workers [39]. Meanwhile, the dark-web and private message-boards
facilitate the dissemination of CSE material [40]. Though this era of online crime
has opened up new commercial opportunities for criminals to expand their illicit
enterprises, it has also created a resource that can be leveraged by law enforcement
in response, and work to make use of this information has already begun.
Indeed, the use of software tools to extract, analyse and visualise detected indica-
tors of human trafficking is not a process unique to the research we have presented.
Existing studies, such as that by Ibanez [41], have sought to utilise open-source data
from message boards and classified ads. Such information, when combined with so-
cial network and phone number analyses has been used to successfully detect the
movement patterns of traffickers and their victims. While Ibanez’s study, at the
time of its publication, was reliant on the manual analysis of open source data – it
does acknowledge the potential future utility of web crawling and natural language
processing (NLP). As we have demonstrated through our research, automated data
extraction and analysis opens the doors to a more expansive and efficient approach
to indicator identification.
Other work, such as that by Poelmans [42] has shown the potential value of FCA
in combating organised crime, and in the case of this work; the specific challenge of
human trafficking. In this particular case, FCA was leveraged as part of a ‘Temporal
Concept Analysis’ on archival policing reports. The techniques were used with some
success to build a profile and eventually identify potential suspects who may be
involved in human trafficking based on historical data.
Approaches which look to leverage the value of OSINT through automated crawl-
ing and analysis have also been employed by researchers working in other areas of
crime and security [43]. Popular applications include those associated with Child
Sexual Exploitation (CSE) material [44], through to the detection of extremist pro-
paganda and terrorist communities [44] and the identification of civil unrest [45, 46].
While many of these approaches deal with text and metadata, other tools are being
developed which seek to analyse multimedia data, such as video and images, for
illicit content [47, 48].
More generally, social media data is being used in a variety of ways as researchers
experiment with new and novel applications to detect and potentially prevent crime
using data derived from the medium. In one such example, social media has been
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used as a way to try and better understand and explain the location of criminal
incidents. For example, Bendler et al. [49] theorised and proved that theft and rob-
bery incidents were more likely in locations with increased social activities, whereas
the opposite was true for vehicle theft.
We can conclude from this review of related work that social media is actively
being studied and used as a source of intelligence and that steps have been made
to automate the process. However, the focus has been predominantly on keyword
searching with the notable exception of the machine learning approach being taken
at Cardiff University [33]. Thus there is a clear gap in this area for the application
of NLP to obtain potentially useful intelligence from sources that would otherwise
be overlooked. The development of the notion of ‘weak signals’, tied to a formal
taxonomy of OC and a set of semantic rule, has the potential to give the analyst a
situational awareness that is fuller and richer than currently possible. There is also
a gap in the analytical capability of exiting approaches - the majority tend to be
focused on information gathering, leaving the analyst to decide how to process and
utilise the information and potentially lead to a situation of information overload,
particularly given the huge amount of online content available. Here, this gap if
filled with the application of FCA and the provision of a map-based interface. The
FCA automatically clusters sources at geographic locations, filters out sources that
are not corroborated and gives the analyst the facility to drill down into clusters of
interest to reveal more detail.
Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper we have demonstrated how using FCA in combination with map based
visualisation, data extraction and natural language processing techniques to extract
and classify data it is possible to detect, through social media, the presence of
corroborated organised crime threats. Establishing the idea of ‘weak signals’ as the
presence of key words and phrases that point to criminality, the approach shows one
way in which social media can be used as the basis for the development of intelligence
from open-sources (OSINT) in order to build on the situational awareness of police
and other law enforcement agencies as they seek to adopt new technologies to aid
in the fight against transnational organised crime threats like Human Trafficking.
This paper has shown how using named entity recognition (NRE) allows for the
detection and extraction of named locations within a given piece of text. The pro-
cess used in this paper focused on sentence-level extraction which appears to provide
reasonable results on Twitter data due to the limited nature of the content provided
in each source, or tweet, when only the source itself is being used - for example,
by not extracting further information from the user’s profile or surrounding con-
tent. Using sentence-level extraction on other sources, such as news articles, often
misses important contextual information given in neighbouring sentences, such as
the country or state that the given named location is within. For NRE to be effec-
tive at extracting locations with greater accuracy, then full-content-level extraction
would be required, which in itself introduces further challenges. Performing NRE
based on a list of known locations also has the challenge identifying words that
whilst they are real locations, they are not likely to be locations in the given con-
text. Such words that have been observed in this project include “buy”, “sell”, and
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“god” which are all names of real locations but were being used in their normal
sense. More sophisticated rule-based extraction is required to ensure the author of
the content is actually referring to a location by detecting language such as “in
Madrid” or even common article layouts such as “MADRID - A man was detained
yesterday, suspected of being the ringleader of a major forced labour syndicate”.
Disambiguating locations once extracted focuses on the challenge of handling
locations with common or similar names. Typically, this is done statistically by
using only most relevant or largest place which presents a risk of false positives.
Probability states that when an source is talking about Washington, it is referring
to Washington, DC rather than Washington County, Alabama, or any number of
other places called Washington. However, this will not always be true and may
not be suitable in the context of OC. Therefore, wider contextual extraction is
imperative in order to provide more accurate results. The presence in the text of
other location-based information could also be exploited for disambiguation, for
example a mention of a building or place in Washington, DC in addition to the
location Washington.
Location granularity proved to be another issue. Whilst the identification of towns
and cities may be useful at a strategic level, at the operational level is it often specific
houses or buildings that are important. However, there may be many houses with
the same number and street name, even within the same geographical area (London
Road, for example, is a very popular road name in the UK). Again, the presence in
the text of other location-based information could help identify the actual house.
The use of location-base coding systems, such as Post Codes in the UK or ZIP
Codes in the US, may provide additional means of extracting specific locations.
Issues of context also apply to other named entities, such as drugs. Whilst we have
successfully implemented comprehensive lists of drug names, including the various
slang terms used, false positives will continue to be a problem unless we can detect
more contextual information to confirm them. ‘Weed’ and ‘grass’ are well-known
terms for the leaf form of cannabis, for example, but including information sources
about gardening would clearly not useful in the context of combating OC. Further
development of rule-based text mining is required to help identity OC as being the
context.
Further work is also required in the detection of false information in malicious,
joke or hoax sources. This area has been explored by a number of researchers, such
as [50, 51, 52] using a variety of approaches including machine learning and natural
language processing. Adding such a level of credibility assessment to the filtering
process will further enhance the effectiveness of the system presented here.
Nevertheless, given the limitations above and the further work required, the cur-
rent system has shown that it is quite capable of providing useful information in the
detection of organised crime threats, as evidenced by the evaluation given above.
The system has also been successfully adapted as part of the European ATHENA
Project [34] where social media is used to provide situational awareness for crisis
management [53]. The system has also be adapted as part of an Open Source Intelli-
gence (OSINT) Hub in the Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence
and Organised Crime Research (CENTRIC) at Sheffield Hallam University. In par-
ticular the approaches used to crawl, filter, analyse and extract data from the web
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and social media have been adapted for these purposes. In ATHENA, an evolved
version of the same processing pipeline described here is used alongside a taxon-
omy and ruleset designed to identify and extract information about crises, such as
natural disasters, terrorist attacks and other events. Within the OSINT hub, the
same techniques are also adapted, in a more exploratory manner, as part of a wider
initiative to explore the broader value and utility of information from open-sources
in providing situational awareness for LEAs, and to supplement existing forms of
evidence in live investigations.
In summary, this work makes a number of contribution to the field: A novel, se-
mantic, approach to identify OC intelligence in social media via the development of a
set of ‘weak signals’ that has the benefit of finding information that would otherwise
be overlooked; a new rule-based approach to categorise and organise information
into structured data; a novel FCA-based approach to deal with information over-
load, provide corroboration of information and provide a framework for analysis
based on geographic location and information drill-drown. It is hoped that these
contributions will be of interest and useful to police practitioners and researchers
in this field.
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